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Victims and the Significance of
Causing Harm
Guyora Binder*
As any mystery reader knows, a dead body is a problem. A
death by violence announces the onset of a conflict between two
worlds, the clandestine, illicit order of the street, and the public
legal order of the state. The consequence of death makes the
otherwise shadowed dramas of petty grifters suddenly conse-
quential enough to attract the state's notice. In detective fic-
tion, the interpreting eye of the state is what turns these small-
time hustles into a tragic narrative, the beginning and middle
needed to account for the victim's bitter end.
The history of Anglo-American criminal law also began
with this problem of the unexplained corpse. While ancient
Germanic law treated violent disputes as quasi-private matters
to be resolved by the parties and their kin, whether in blood or
money, Danish and Norman occupiers treated certain acts of vi-
olence as matters of public concern. Thus, they charged Anglo-
Saxon villages an "ammercement" for each unattributed killing
of one of their compatriots there.' Eventually, royal courts took
jurisdiction over all homicides. 2
As breaches of the king's peace, violent deaths were of-
fenses against the crown. The sovereign could tolerate the con-
trolled use of force within the household. This was not disorder,
but the proper exercise of governing authority. On the other
hand, armed conflict among men in public places raised the
* University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Law
School, State University of New York
1. 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 26
(London, MacMillan 1883); CARLETON K. ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 23-24 (1953).
2. JULIUS GOEBEL, FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 423-40 (University of Pennsylvania Press 1976)
(1937); NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307,
at 7-9 (1969); Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-
1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 417-19 (1976).
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question of who governed. 3 In a state without a regular armed
police force, the outbreak of such violence was an ever-present
threat. A killing was particularly problematic because it could
not be hidden and might well provoke retaliation. Killing there-
fore became a pivotal event, transforming what might otherwise
remain a private dispute into a public wrong that challenged
sovereignty and triggered the jurisdiction of the royal courts.
We can think of homicide victims as spectral sentries guarding
the frontiers of the ancient criminal law and mutely bearing
witness to trespasses against the royal domain.
To this day, criminal law frequently conditions punishment
on causing harmful results like death.4 Intentional killing is
generally punished more severely than failed attempts to kill;5
reckless homicide is punished far more severely than dangerous
but non-fatal acts like assault or reckless driving.6 Much dan-
gerous conduct remains unexamined and unpunished until it
leads to harm. Many of us have caught ourselves acting irre-
sponsibly behind the wheel and felt grateful relief that our stu-
pidity or inattention escaped a collision with fate. But who
among us has felt remorseful enough to stop a cop and turn our-
selves in for our unconsummated calamities? Even in the deep-
est recesses of conscience we reassure ourselves, "no harm, no
foul." If we are thus willing to accept "moral luck" when it fa-
vors us, should we not also take the bad with the good?
Yet many criminal law theorists find the punishment of
harm puzzling and even, in Sanford Kadish's phrase, "ration-
3. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 40-41 (London, Cambridge University
Press 1968) (1898).
4. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 331-32 (4th ed. 2003) (describing range of
crimes requiring causation of a harmful result).
5. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 375 (3rd ed. 2001); JOHN
KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYoRA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 635 (5th ed. 2004)
(most jurisdictions punish attempts less than completed offenses); LAFAVE, supra
note 4, at 580 (common law doctrine that attempted felony was misdemeanor).
6. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2004) (defining reckless endanger-
ment in the first degree as a class D felony for recklessly creating a grave risk of
death with depraved indifference to human life); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (Mc-
Kinney 2006) (defining murder in the second degree as a class A-I felony for caus-
ing death as a result of recklessly creating a grave risk of death with depraved
indifference to human life).
7. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979) and BERNARD WIL-
LIAMS, MORAL LUCK 20-39 (1981), for explanations of the problem of moral luck.
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ally indefensible."8 They argue that acts should be evaluated
only on the basis of the risks they create and the actors' aware-
ness of those risks. One who knowingly imposes an unjustified
risk on others acts wrongly, whether or not the risk eventuates
in harm.9 There are two main arguments for this position, one
retributivist in its premises and the other utilitarian.
Retributivism is generally seen as an application of deonto-
logical ethics to criminal justice.10 It pays homage to Kant's ac-
count of morality as fairness or non-hypocrisy. According to
Kant's classic formulation of a retributivist account of punish-
ment, the enjoyment of legal rights is a cooperative achieve-
ment that depends upon mutual forbearance from violating the
rights of others and mutual agreement that those who willfully
violate these rights shall suffer punishment. Accordingly, to en-
joy and assert legal rights entails a moral duty to respect the
rights of others or submit to punishment."
On first reflection, retributivism would seem to support
punishment for those who violate rights by inflicting actual
harm. Yet some retributivists have been very influenced by
Kant's idea that morality is a matter of acting on the basis of a
good (that is, a fair or impartial) will. Based on this subjective
conception of morality, they argue that the results of conduct
8. Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw,
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 697 (1994).
9. Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 936, 946-47 (2000); Larry Alexander & Kimberly
D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138,
1174-78 (1997); Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 2183, 2184-91 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 379-81; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and
Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1974).
10. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31-58 (1976); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Three Mistakes about Retributivism, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THER-
APY 77 (Wilfrid Sellars & Keith Lehrer eds., 1979).
11. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 80 (John Ladd
trans., Hackett Pub'g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS]; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9-21
(Alan W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) [hereinafter KANT,
GROUNDWORK]; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 31-58; Guyora Binder, Punishment The-
ory: Moral or Political? 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 350-66 (2002); Michael Davis,
How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726 (1983).
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are irrelevant in judging whether an act deserves punishment. 2
According to this view, an actor who claims and benefits from
legal rights violates a moral duty by knowingly imposing an un-
justified risk of harm to a right (or other legally protected inter-
est). It is the inner decision to violate a moral duty by defecting
from the cooperative scheme that constitutes the wrong. Once
the actor has culpably imposed a risk, the wrongful and culpa-
ble act is complete. The results of his act are often out of his
hands. Whether his shot hits its target or misses, whether the
victim is driving a sturdy or a flimsy vehicle, whether medical
treatment saves the victim, these are all irrelevant in assessing
the actor's moral fault. These outcomes are a matter of mere
fortuity or moral luck.13
Utilitarian penology derives originally from the writings of
legal reformers Beccaria and Bentham, who emphasized the
power of mild but regular penal sanctions to deter crime.' 4 To-
day it is often understood as an application of act-utilitarian
ethics to problems of criminal justice. Act-utilitarianism holds
that moral decisionmakers should act so as to produce those
consequences that will maximize the aggregate welfare of all
persons. 15 According to this view, when the state punishes, it is
a moral decisionmaker. The punitive infliction of suffering can
only be justified morally, if it will prevent more suffering, pre-
sumably by deterring harmful acts or incapacitating those who
would otherwise commit them in the future.
Again it seems that a concern with preventing harm-in
the sense of aggregate disutility-should militate in favor of
punishing those who actually cause it. But surprisingly, there
are reasons to doubt the deterrent benefits of punishing harm.
12. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw 195-96 (1997); A.W. Moore, A Kantian View of Moral Luck, 65 PHIL. 297, 304
(1990).
13. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 33 (1974); Alexander, supra note 9,
at 935; Kadish, supra note 8, at 682; Kessler, supra note 9, 378-86; Morse, supra
note 9, at 379-81; Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 1565-69; Michael J. Zimmerman,
Luck and Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374, 382-85 (1982).
14. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 46-81 (David Young
trans., 1986) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170, 183, 288 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of
London 1970) (1789).
15. See generally J.J.C. SMART, OUTLINE OF A UTILITARIAN SYSTEM OF ETHICS
(1961) (exposition of act-utilitarian ethics).
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These derive from Bentham and Beccaria's original claim that
moderate but certain punishment deters more effectively than
severe but uncertain punishment. 16 By this reasoning, we
would deter a particular act more effectively by sending all who
commit it to jail for a year than by randomly selecting half and
sending them to jail for two years.
The assumption that certainty deters more effectively than
severity rests on several intuitions about the diminishing mar-
ginal disutility of incarceration. First, most people discount fu-
ture welfare, so the utility loss from the second year of prison
influences choice less than the utility loss from the first year
because it is farther in the future.17 Second, because people
adapt their preferences to their circumstances, the utility loss
from the second year should be less.' 8 Third, if the disutility
associated with incarceration depends upon either a temporary
feeling of status degradation or a permanent stigma, the term of
incarceration may not affect welfare that much.
There may be additional reasons why severe but uncertain
punishment does not deter very effectively. Criminologist Jack
Katz has argued that certain types of offenders, notably armed
robbers, are risk-preferring. They relish the dramatic uncer-
tainty of armed confrontation as an opportunity to demonstrate
courage and assert an indomitable will.19 A small chance of a
large penalty may offer the challenge of a high stakes gamble,
an opportunity to beat the odds and win.
Empirical analysis of law enforcement campaigns appears
to bear out the assumption that certainty deters more effec-
16. Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 1533-37, 1546.
17. Id. at 1540; Michael K. Bock & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of
Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975); Alon Harel
& Uzi Segal, Criminal Law & Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the
Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 276, 280,
296-97 (1999); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Dis-
counting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12
(1999).
18. John Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago
View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 432 (1980);
John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing
the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 189, 201-02 (2005).
19. JACK KATZ, THE SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 164-236 (1988).
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tively than severity. 20 If this assumption is true, it follows that
all equally dangerous and equally culpable acts should be pun-
ished equally. To attempt to deter harm by punishing only
those acts of risk taking that actually cause harm is to create a
"punishment lottery," reducing the certainty of punishment for
the class of risky acts that produce harm. This should be less
effective than punishing risk-imposition uniformly, but
mildly. 21
These arguments suggest that punishing harm advances
neither of the two purportedly paramount goals of the criminal
justice system, desert and deterrence. 22 Why then is it such a
stubborn feature of our criminal law? On the other hand, if our
chief theories of criminal law, utilitarianism and retributivism,
cannot explain a persistent feature of our criminal law, maybe
they are missing something important. A dead body turns out
to be a problem for our prevailing theories of punishment as
well.
It seems to me that the root of this problem lies in a com-
mon misconception as to what the purpose is of a theory of pun-
ishment. We know that goods like desert and deterrence are
important aims of the criminal justice system, and it seems sen-
sible that they should play a role in justifying punishment. But
we have too readily assumed that the kind of justification they
provide for punishment must be moral. Even though we are
lawyers, trained in generating normative arguments from eclec-
tic sources, we assume that a normative theory of punishment
must be the task of a moral philosopher. Thus we assume a
theory of punishment must begin with a general theory of
20. 3 LEON RADzINOwIcz, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 452-56 (1957); Johannes Andenaes, General Pre-
vention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 176
(1952); Anthony Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Ac-
cepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 143 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2003).
21. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 48 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al.
eds., Gryphon Eds., Ltd. 1982) (1881); THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY ET AL., A
PENAL CODE 63-65 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1838); Schulhofer, supra note
9, at 1539-41.
22. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-102 (West 2004) (retribution and deterrence
among aims of penal code); DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 13-18 (explaining retribu-
tion and deterrence theories of punishment in terms of deontological and conse-
quentialist morality).
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value. This must generate some general standard against
which all human acts can be measured, such as the utility prin-
ciple or the categorical imperative. An institution like punish-
ment is then reducible to acts of individuals, and it is justifiable
when the acts composing it are justifiable morally.23 From this
perspective, the value of desert is derived from deontological
ethics, and the value of deterring crimes depends upon act-utili-
tarian ethics. For these two ethical theories, acts that culpably
impose harm are indistinguishable from acts that culpably im-
pose risk and so should be treated alike.
But perhaps we should not expect to derive rules of crimi-
nal law from morality alone. The problem of justifying punish-
ment is a political problem, arising as part of the larger problem
of justifying the coercive force and prescriptive power of the
state. A purely moral assessment of punishment leaves out the
concern with the law's authority and the state's legitimacy that
seemed so important in the development of the English criminal
law. Rather than asking what rules of criminal law would be
ideally fair or maximally efficacious in some hypothetical world,
perhaps we should ask what role criminal punishment can best
play in legitimating a particular state for its population.
I have elsewhere argued that if we interpret retributivism
and utilitarianism as moral theories, both have counterintuitive
implications for criminal justice.24 Utilitarianism seems to
counsel officials to frame and punish the innocent if that will
most effectively deter crime; while retributivism seems to coun-
sel private persons to exact vigilante justice if that will impose
deserved suffering.25 What connects these two counterintuitive
implications is that both ignore the special responsibilities that
public officials have by virtue of their roles. Public officials are
agents of the public authorized to do things other individuals
may not, but also obliged to justify their actions in a way that is
transparent to that public. Criminal law is the law of state
punishment, and so a normative theory of criminal law should
23. Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punish-
ment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 121 (2000); Binder, supra note 11, at
321.
24. Binder, supra note 11, at 322-28.
25. Id. at 322-23, 325-28.
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have something to say about the political competence of the
state.
If utilitarianism is understood as a political theory, the ob-
ligation of public officials is not just to maximize public utility
but to justify their actions to the public as utility-maximizing. 26
Utility is much better served by a publicly controlled policy pro-
cess than by freeing public officials to act under cover of decep-
tion. Utilitarian psychology tells us that individuals are
ordinarily motivated by self-interest, not the public interest.
Identifying and pursuing the public interest is a cooperative
achievement requiring careful institutional design. Thus, utili-
tarian penology is based on utility as a public value governing
institutions, not utility as a personal moral imperative gov-
erning individual choice. This means that utilitarian penology
will prioritize the institutional conditions required to insure the
proper definition and pursuit of utility over particular improve-
ments in welfare. 27
We can give a similarly political account of retributivism.
On this view, retributive punishment is not just about the allo-
cation of moral responsibility among individuals, but about the
construction of legal authority. For Kant, retribution is a kind
of justice that presupposes a rule of law.28 The moral duty to
suffer punishment flows not from the viciousness of the crimi-
nal act as such, but from the hypocrisy of violating legal rights
of a kind one claims and enjoys. 29 The rule of law is a necessa-
rily cooperative achievement that alone can justify self-gratifi-
cation as the exercise of a right. Similarly, the rule of law alone
can justify retaliation as deserved retribution for violating a
right. Thus, retributive justice is an exclusively public respon-
sibility. Only a public official can express public disapprobation
by punishing, and only a public official can warrant such a pun-
ishment as earned.30 This means that public retribution pro-
vides an authoritative vindication of victims and an
26. Binder & Smith, supra note 23, at 167-68, 176-78, 189-209.
27. Id. at 210-13.
28. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 11, at 128, 138-41; KANT,
GROUNWORK, supra note 11, at 56; Binder, supra note 11, at 352-53, 355-60.
29. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 11, at 172; Binder, supra note
11, at 350-53.
30. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 117 (1970); KANT, META-
PHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 11, at 119-20.
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authoritative condemnation of offenders that private vigilante
violence cannot.
When we reinterpret our traditional theories of punish-
ment in this way, as political rather than moral theories, we are
emphasizing the character of punishment as an institution. In-
stitutions are social practices organizing collective action by
classifying situations as subject to norms.31 Institutional prac-
tices often allocate classificatory judgments to particular indi-
viduals and require that they follow particular procedures.
These individuals act with institutional authority. Authorita-
tive judgments give others content-independent reasons for ac-
tion.3 2 Thus, in a legal system, the fact that a prescription is
duly enacted as law becomes a reason to follow it, whether or
not an individual thinks the prescription is otherwise morally
obligatory or just.3 3
Individuals tend to accept institutional authority for at
least three reasons. First, they may trust that institutionally
authorized decision makers are especially competent to make
substantive value judgments. 34 Second, they may want to
achieve benefits that can only be realized through cooperation
and so may be willing to support what they regard as a second-
best norm because others are supporting it. Third, they may
succumb to social influence 35-a good thing if it allows them to
overcome self-interest to cooperate. Institutions are necessarily
collaborative practices. In evaluating an institution, we can
only compare it to hypothetical alternatives that could actually
command authority and motivate widespread compliance. If,
31. See NEIL MACCORMICK & OTA WEINBERGER, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LAW (1986); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Guy PETERS, INSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1999); DICK RUITER, INSTITUTIONAL LEGAL
FACTS (1993); RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1995); JOHN
SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995) (defining and applying con-
cept of institutions).
32. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF
LAw AND POLITICS 219 (1994).
33. PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 40-42, 98-111, 188, 238-39
(Richard Nice trans., 1990); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-88 (1994); Jo-
SEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233-49 (1979).
34. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53 (1986).
35. Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 349-56 (1997).
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for example, punishing harm legitimates criminal justice in the
culture we actually have, it does no good to say punishing risk
would better deter offending in a society of perfectly rational
self-interest maximizers. A society of perfectly rational self-in-
terest maximizers would obey laws only in so far as they were
coerced to do so. Compliance might be very low in such an unco-
operative society. 36
Given a conception of an institution as a practice of using
norms to organize collective action, we can define law as includ-
ing any institution that is relatively coercive, formal, and self-
conscious. 37 Law's coercive quality is a function of its use of
sanctions to encourage compliance with norms. Law's formality
consists in the prominence of authority or content-independent
reasons for obeying legal norms. Law's self-consciousness as an
institution consists in the prominence ofjustificatory argument
in its decision procedures. So, legal institutions involve norms
of conduct understood, in principle, to be binding on persons
recognized as occupying certain statuses, whether or not those
individuals accept those obligations. These conduct norms are
chosen or identified by persons recognized as occupying authori-
tative statuses, according to norms of procedure and discursive
justification. They are backed by coercive sanctions, which are
imposed by persons occupying authoritative statuses, according
to norms of procedure, decision, and discursive justification. 38
To characterize law as an institution is to say that legal
processes condition participation on the acceptance of norms
and the performance of roles (statuses subject to particular
norms). Institutional roles channel action by supplying actors
with a set of motives, concerns, and assumptions and a limited
repertoire of behaviors. Roles render action intelligible and pre-
dictable to others. The desires to communicate to others or to
be associated with certain roles can therefore motivate compli-
36. See generally Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 37 (1989) (as-
sumption or self-interested rationality used to justify institution of property can-
not explain how it arises).
37. Guyora Binder, Aesthetic Judgment and Legal Justification, 43 STUD. L.
POL. & Soc'y 79, 89 (2008).
38. Id.
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ance with norms. In other words, people can comply with
norms out of expressive rather than instrumental motives. 39
As an institutional practice, then, law commands not only
or ultimately by threatening.40 Law orders society through the
combined effects of coercive force and normative authority.
Norms without force are not laws, but commands are not laws
unless they are obeyed also out of a sense of obligation. Moreo-
ver, law's force and its authority are integrally connected. On
the one hand, law can muster manpower and marshal weapons
only because many people agree that its commands should be
obeyed. On the other hand, the availability of coercive force en-
hances law's authority. Because many will prefer any effective
legal system, however unjust, to anarchy or violent civil conflict,
force tends to generate its own legitimacy. To view law as an
institution, however, is to emphasize the role of law's normative
authority in inducing compliance and legitimizing state force.
That authority is a cultural construct, real in so far as people
believe it to be so.
Punishment is an institution in the sense that it is also
more than mere coercive force. Punishment is always the en-
forcement of a preexisting authoritative conduct norm carried
out by one duly authorized to enforce that norm.41 To punish is
therefore to claim such authority. Even within the family, the
power to punish implies the authority to enforce a preexisting
norm, binding on the person punished. Whether or not punish-
ment implies a claim to moral rectitude, then, it always implies
a claim to political legitimacy. Much violent conflict involves
much more than simple hostility or a dispute over access to re-
sources. It involves contests over the political authority to
make and enforce norms represented by the power to punish.
39. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 6-7, 11-15 (1993);
GUoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 474-75 (2000);
RAz, supra note 34, at 288-308.
40. HERBERT PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 62-66 (1968); ALF
Ross, ON GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 37-38 (1975); Johannes
Andenaes, The General Prevention Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949,
950 (1966); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 401, 406, 409-13 (1958); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 468-70 (1997); Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers,
Martyrs and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94
YALE L.J. 315, 333-36 (1984).
41. Binder, supra note 11, at 321.
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All violence connotes a claim to this kind of punitive authority
and so implies a challenge to the political equality of the victim.
That is why violence is so provocative-it always adds insult to
injury.
Because punishment combines coercion with a claim to po-
litical authority, the punitive sanction has two aspects, each
needing justification. Punishment imposes both suffering and
blame. Punishment is a material disincentive: it must have a
sting. But it also expresses a message. The punishing power
repudiates the offender's act without any bargaining or compro-
mise. Society can express this revulsion unequivocally by will-
ingly sacrificing the social welfare. Thus, punishment does not
simply internalize cost by shifting resources from an offender to
a victim (or a victim's social insurance fund). Compensation of
this kind tolerates, even justifies, costly conduct by pricing it.
By contrast, punishment inflicts suffering without immediate
benefit to anyone, thereby expressing condemnation.
The afflictive aspect of punishment explains the appeal of
utilitarianism, which justifies the imposition of suffering to pre-
vent greater suffering in the future. The expressive aspect of
punishment explains the appeal of retributivism, which offers
criteria for justifying blame and condemnation as deserved.
However, neither theory seems adequate to explain both dimen-
sions of punishment. Doing so requires an understanding of
punishment as a political institution. Yet such a political ac-
count of punishment can also explain the persistence of punish-
ment for actual harm.
Desert and utility may be-perhaps should be-important
criteria for a democratic public to use in evaluating the legiti-
macy of criminal justice. But without legitimacy a criminal jus-
tice system is unlikely to achieve either value. First, consider
the criminal law's efficacy in deterring crime. The deterrent
threat of punishment will only be effective in so far as crimes
are reported and offenders are identified, charged, convicted,
and punished. A criminal justice system without popular sup-
port may not win cooperation from witnesses, law enforcement,
jurors, or judges.42 A haphazardly enforced criminal law is
likely to be unfair as well as ineffective. Moreover, the deter-
42. Seidman, supra note 40, at 334-35.
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rent efficacy of the criminal law does not depend only on the
credibility of its threats. Most people obey criminal law most of
the time because they have internalized the law's conduct stan-
dards as their own. 43 An illegitimate criminal law cannot mo-
bilize conscience in this way and must rely on coercion. It is not
enough that citizens see the rules of the criminal law as morally
appropriate. It is important that they see those rules as having
a personal claim on their loyalty and obedience, even when they
disagree with them.
Criminal law, then, is a political institution that stakes a
claim on the loyalty of those subject to it. Thus, its first impera-
tive is not to be fair, not to be efficacious, but to conserve its own
authority. An authoritative criminal law plays an important
role in legitimating a modem liberal state by helping to estab-
lish the public good of a rule of law. According to this concep-
tion, the rule of law is a cooperative institution that secures
mutual recognition of the civic status of all members of society.
In a liberal state, the rule of law is supposed to secure mutual
recognition of equal status.
Criminal law's particular importance in establishing civic
equality rests on the pervasive significance of violence in
human culture as a symbol of unequal status. To use force
against others is to assert superiority over them in one of two
slightly different forms. One possible meaning of violence is to
assert political authority over a victim, a right to enforce obedi-
ence. Criminal punishment denies offenders this authority by
reasserting the criminal law's monopoly on coercive force and by
subordinating offenders to that law and so to the legal rights of
their victims. 44
Alternatively, in abusing a victim, the violent actor chal-
lenges the victim's honor. The victim must defend him or her-
self or avenge the wrong, or else be deemed to have acquiesced
in it, thereby showing cowardice or lack of self-respect. Con-
versely, by accepting the risks of violent conflict, the abuser per-
versely gains in honor. In a society that tolerates violence, each
member is under constant pressure to secure her status by us-
43. See sources cited supra note 40.
44. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGVENESS AND MERCY 124-30
(Jean Hampton & Jeffrie F. Murphy eds., 1998).
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ing force defensively or even preemptively.45 The result can be
the escalating vengeance of the blood feud46 or the gratuitous
predation of the prison yard.47 Criminal law makes the state
the custodian of status by regulating violence. In return for citi-
zens accepting the rule of law by forswearing private ven-
geance, the state undertakes to vindicate the dignity of each
citizen by avenging wrongs on his or her behalf.48
Because the state is able to marshal the disapproval of all
citizens who accept its rule of law, its retribution can reduce the
status of the offender and vindicate the rights of the victim
more effectively than can private vengeance. Of course a famil-
ial, religious, or ethnic group can warrant the status of a victim
within the group by avenging the wrong done him or her. But if
the offender is affiliated with a rival group capable of further
retaliation, the justice of the victim's claim can remain contro-
versial, and so the external status of the victim can remain con-
tested. To make matters worse, in a society divided into
contending clans, the degradation of one victim threatens the
status of every member of the group. By contrast, a unitary
state can avenge a victim in a way that is stable and final. The
state is an institutional representation of the entire political
community and is taken to speak for everyone, even the of-
fender and his kin. This is perhaps what is meant by contempo-
rary talk of punishment providing "closure" for victims and
their families. 49 It restores their status in a way that does not
provoke further challenge. Of course, in the post-heroic society
established by the state's rule of law, the victim is deprived of
45. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 29-34, 181, 185 (1990).
46. Id. at 181-87.
47. JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON
75-76 (1981) (examining social pressures on prison inmates to avenge insults and
injuries).
48. Of course, we should not exaggerate the comprehensiveness of a rule of
law, nor should we conflate the rule of law with equality. The state's monopoly on
violence is never complete, even in theory. Persons will sometimes be privileged to
use force in defense of their own or others' entitlements, albeit as agents of the
state. Moreover, if these entitlements are unequal, this authorized violence can
reinforce hierarchy. A rule of law tends to stabilize status, to protect it from con-
testation, but not necessarily to equalize it.
49. However, there is evidence that psychological recovery from violence does
not depend on such responses as vengeance, punishment, compensation, or apol-
ogy. See JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 188-95 (1997).
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the opportunity to personally win honor at the offender's ex-
pense.50 But the victim is compensated for this "loss" by escap-
ing the constant pressure to risk life and limb to secure his or
her own honor.
The rule of law state is thus an enormously important coop-
erative achievement. It precludes cycles of organized retalia-
tory violence, secures the dignity of each individual, and
thereby also frees individuals to organize their lives around the
pursuit of non-martial virtues. Yet, in asserting a monopoly on
retaliatory force, the state deprives individuals and groups of
the option of securing their own dignity. In so doing, the state
undertakes an obligation to each individual to act on his or her
behalf. This obligation is not a guarantee that the individual
will not be victimized. The rule of law state promises the public
generally that it will achieve social order by reducing violence to
tolerable levels, not by eliminating it altogether. But the state's
promise to each individual is to restore his or her status and
vindicate his or her rights if he or she is victimized by violence.
If the state leaves a wrong unredressed, it permits the of-
fender's assertion of authority over the victim and leaves the
degraded victim no recourse. This promise to retaliate on the
victim's behalf is crucial in persuading the individual to trans-
fer her loyalty from the rivalrous group, clan, gang, or sect to
the unitary state.
This account of public retribution as a substitute for private
or group vengeance incorporates aspects of both retributivism
and utilitarianism. It incorporates the retributivist conception
of criminal law as a social contract, a cooperative institution
that conditions rights on the duties to respect and enforce the
rights of others. Yet it also incorporates a utilitarian concern
with consequences. On this account, a rule of law is desirable
not because it is fair, but because its popular acceptance as fair
allows it to prevent violence efficiently. In other words, in our
particular social and cultural conditions, a regime of retributive
punishment can enhance the authority of law. It can thereby
motivate voluntary compliance and reduce costly reliance on co-
50. For this reason, Friedrich Nietzsche critiqued punishment as cowardly.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MoRALs 72-74 (Walter Kaufmann,
trans., Vintage 1967) (1887); see also MOORE, supra note 12, at 120-21 (explicating
Nietzsche's views).
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ercive force. It can take advantage of what Paul Robinson and
John Darley have called "the utility of desert."51
Although this kind of mixed theory of punishment is popu-
lar among lawmakers and legal theorists,52 moral philosophers
object to it as unprincipled. Retributivists object that this kind
of reasoning is not true retributivism but "revenge utilitarian-
ism," because it ultimately values punishment for its conse-
quences rather than its fairness.5 3 Indeed, they argue that
punishing to preempt vengeance rather than to do justice
merely indulges and encourages base motives. But endorsing
the institution of punishment because of its beneficial conse-
quences in preventing violence does not entail endorsing partic-
ular acts of punishment regardless of their fairness. To prevent
violence effectively, punishment must win the loyalty of the
widest possible constituency, and the most reliable way to do so
is to treat people fairly. But the people on whose loyalty the
rule of law depends include not only potential offenders, but
also potential victims. So punishing in order to preempt private
vengeance is not a matter of yielding to unjustified hostility.
Victims are justifiably resentful against those who violate their
rights. We punish in order to maintain the fairness and integ-
rity of an institution that has undertaken to stand up for the
equal status of victims while precluding them from doing this
for themselves. We adopt such an institution because it secures
equal status more reliably and at less social cost than the alter-
native institution of the blood feud.
This account of criminal punishment as a political institu-
tion, rather than a moral act, helps explain our practice of pun-
ishing actual harm. To see this, let us review some of the
leading arguments philosophers have offered for punishing
harm. A review of these arguments reveals that we cannot eas-
ily make sense of our practice of punishing harm on the basis of
the offender's moral desert alone. Instead we must factor in po-
litical obligations to victims.
Philosophers have offered at least five reasons why those
who culpably cause harm deserve more punishment than those
51. Robinson & Darley, supra note 40, at 453.
52. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-13 (1968); PACKER,
supra note 40; Hart, supra note 40; Robinson & Darley, supra note 40.
53. MOORE, supra note 12, at 207-08; Kessler, supra note 9, at 2216.
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who culpably impose risk. We may call these the determinist
slippery slope, the lottery ticket argument, the remorse anal-
ogy, the undeserved gratification argument, and the unde-
served status argument.
The determinist slippery slope is retributivist legal philoso-
pher Michael Moore's answer to the moral luck argument.
Moore argues that reducing actual harm to a matter of luck
places the theorist on a slippery slope towards a deterministic
view of choice and character as matters of luck as well. If an
actor cannot be blamed for a consequence that would not have
occurred under other circumstances, why should he or she be
blamed for creating a risk that would have been less under
other circumstances? Why should he or she be blamed for a
choice he or she would not have made under less tempting cir-
cumstances, or with better parenting and education, or differ-
ent genetic endowments? 54 If we accept the premise of the
moral luck argument, that actors deserve punishment only for
their choices, we need some way to separate the actor's choices
from his or her circumstances. Otherwise, we render the re-
tributivist project of deserved punishment incoherent and
unachievable.
For Moore, the concept of action is the ledge that stops the
slide down the determinist slope. Moore rejects the claim that
action inherently involves risk but only contingently involves
harm. Instead, he offers a picture of action as embodied willing.
On this view, willing must produce some intended conse-
quence-moving a body part in a desired direction-to count as
action at all.55 So if we require action as a requisite of criminal
liability, we are already basing punishment on consequences.
Those who object to punishing harm are simply disagreeing
about which consequences should matter.
This argument is fine as far as it goes, but it may not take
us far enough up the slippery slope to justify punishing harm.
Yes, perhaps we can justify conditioning punishment on conse-
quences as unavoidable-at least if we are going to have a lib-
eral state that dces not excessively police thought and
association. But why must the consequences we punish be
54. MOORE, supra note 12, at 232-46.
55. Id.
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harms? That we cannot act without causing consequences does
not necessarily mean we choose all the consequences of our ac-
tions. While most modern criminal justice systems punish harm
more than risk (holding other considerations equal), they still
also punish crimes of harmless risk imposition. And by Moore's
admission, a wrongful act can fall short of causing harm in any
material sense. So his argument that deserved punishment for
wrongful choice logically requires conditioning punishment on
consequences does not imply any requirement of harmful conse-
quences. Thus, Moore's argument does not identify any reason
why ignoring actual harm would violate desert. We must look
for some other justification for conditioning punishment on
harm.
A second argument for punishing harm is philosopher
David Lewis's lottery ticket argument. Lewis answers the
moral luck objection by asserting the fairness of conditioning
punishment on harmful consequences. He reasons that there is
nothing unfair in determining the punishment for a particular
offense on the basis of chance, as long as the odds are set and
announced in advance. 56 As long as the offender is not
ambushed by a retroactive penalty he could not have foreseen in
choosing to offend, he assumes the risk of a variable penalty.
Committing a crime is then like purchasing a lottery ticket, of-
fering a determinate chance of a payoff, albeit a negative one.
Indeed, given the inherent uncertainty of apprehension and
conviction facing any offender, the penalty attached to crime is
always a gamble. Since we don't consider it unfair to punish
those offenders who are convicted simply because they had a
chance of escaping punishment, we should not consider it unfair
to punish those who cause harm because they had a chance of
not doing so.
This argument may provoke the rejoinder that escaping
punishment because of uncertain apprehension, although inevi-
table, is undeserved, and that conditioning punishment on
chance results in similarly undeserved but avoidable deficien-
cies or excesses of punishment. But even if we accept the argu-
ment that subjecting offenders to a punishment lottery does not
56. David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 53, 63-67 (1989).
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violate desert, that argument does not justify us in doing so. It
means punishing harm satisfies desert as a negative constraint
on punishment, but it does not mean we have affirmatively jus-
tified this choice among permitted approaches to punishment.
To explain why we feel obliged to punish an equally culpable
offender more if he caused actual harm, we have to talk about
the victim.
Thus, when we determine that an offender has imposed a
risk culpably on others, by hypothesis she is aware of the odds
she will harm a victim. It may seem fitting to expect the of-
fender to bear a similar risk, by conditioning her punishment on
the harm she culpably causes. 57 This argument for conditioning
punishment on harm depends on the fairness to victims of mak-
ing the offender's suffering commensurate to that of the victim,
rather than allowing the offender to endure less suffering than
he happens to inflict. Thus, the obligation to punish harm
seems to derive from the political duty to vindicate victims
rather than the moral duty to give offenders what they deserve.
A third argument that punishment for harm is deserved is
the remorse analogy, which likens the standards by which we
impose punishment to the standards by which we judge our own
actions. If most people feel that harm merits greater punish-
ment,58 it may be because it is normal to feel a greater sense of
remorse when we cause harm and a sense of relief when our
careless actions cause no harm.59 Legal philosopher Antony
Duff argues that one whose remorse for a careless action is un-
affected by its results fails to show the empathy expected of a
morally developed person.60 Just as we regret our own harm-
less wrongdoing less than our harmful wrongdoing and there-
fore judge ourselves less harshly, we are more inclined to
forgive others when their wrongdoing proves harmless. Duff ar-
gues that when we punish harm we communicate to the of-
57. Id.
58. Paul H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 13-28,
74-79 (1995).
59. R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 189-90 (1990).
60. Id. at 189. See also MOORE, supra note 12, at 231.
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fender that an extra measure of regret is morally obligatory as
an expression of the empathy owed the victim. 61
But is this an argument that the harmful wrongdoer de-
serves more punishment, or that the injured victim is owed
more punishment? Our own feelings of remorse upon causing
harm probably transcend disappointment in ourselves. Indeed,
to the extent we are more disappointed in ourselves when we
cause harm rather than imposing unjustifiable risk, it is largely
because of our decreased ability to delude ourselves into mini-
mizing the risk we carelessly imposed. 62 But insofar as our rel-
ative complacency about our own harmless wrongdoing results
from self-serving self-deception, it has no moral weight and pro-
vides no justification for punishing harmless wrongdoers less
than harmful ones. So what legitimate reasons do we have for
feeling worse when we cause harm? We may feel empathy for
our victims, shame because the lasting effects of our wrongful
choices can make them enduring features of our social identi-
ties, and concern that we have given offense and provoked hos-
tility. Thus, a good deal of the added remorse we feel when our
careless wrongdoing causes harm is directed at our relations
with others.
How should we translate these relational concerns in anal-
ogizing our impulses to punish harmful wrongdoers to our feel-
ings of remorse upon causing harm? Do we punish to coerce the
offender to empathize with the victim, to reprove the offender
for failing to do so, or to express our own empathy? Do we pun-
ish only to force the offender to recognize the victim's rights, or
also to express our own recognition of the victim's rights? Do
we punish to force the offender to redress his offense against the
victim and appease her hostility? Or do we punish also in order
to avoid complicity in that offense and deflect the victim's hos-
tility from ourselves? Kant described the duty to punish as a
duty to avoid complicity in the offense and Joel Feinberg identi-
61. R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATrEMPTS 345 (1996); R.A. Duff, Subjectivism, Objec-
tivism, and Attempts, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 19, 37-39 (A. P. Simester & A. T.
H. Smith eds., 1996); DUFF, supra note 59, at 191-92.
62. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of the Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L.
REV. 1097, 1106 (1952) ("From the preventive point of view, the harmfulness of
conduct rests upon its tendency to cause the injuries to be prevented far more than
on its actual result; results, indeed, have meaning only insofar as they may indi-
cate or dramatize the tendencies involved.").
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fled various forms of societal disavowal of the offense as expres-
sive functions of punishment.63 What I am suggesting is that
we punish harm not only in order to express something to the
offender and about the offender, but also to express something
to the victim and about the victim to others. We punish not
only in order to admonish the offender that he or she should
respect the victim, but also in order to show the victim our own
respect. If so, we are punishing harm for a purpose that tran-
scends doing justice to the offender.
The remorse analogy is closely related to a fourth argument
for punishing harm: the undeserved gratification argument.
This argument is rooted in Kant's moral philosophy, which de-
fines a moral act as one determined by a "good will," properly
motivated by duties of fair cooperation. An immoral act is de-
termined by a bad will, one that yields to a desire incapable of
realization if universalized. 64 Punishment serves to enforce du-
ties of fair cooperation by frustrating such anti-cooperative
desires.65 Kant therefore argued that no penalty should be im-
posed on a drowning swimmer who wrested a plank from an-
other, because no later penalty could possibly negate his
immediate desire to survive. Such a sanction could not consti-
tute punishment because it could not frustrate the desire moti-
vating the crime. 66 Kantian punishment makes the offender's
illicit desire self-defeating, thereby illustrating the futility of
such a desire if universalized.
On these premises, punishment for intentionally causing
harm fairly corrects an offender's undeserved gratification for
causing it. If we punished attempts and completed crimes
equally, successful offenders would be left more satisfied than
unsuccessful attempters. Their regret at having been caught
and punished would be mitigated by their pleasure in having
achieved their criminal aims. From this viewpoint, we are
obliged to punish the successful wrongdoer more than the at-
tempter lest we become complicit in his self-indulgence by per-
63. FEINBERG, supra note 13, at 98-105; KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS,
supra note 11, at 138.
64. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 61 (H. J.
Paton trans., 1964) (1785).
65. Binder, supra note 11, at 352-55.
66. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS, supra note 11, at 35-36, 139.
2008]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
mitting his undeserved gratification. 67 H.L.A Hart approved
this argument as "the nearest to a rational defense" he knew for
the principle that harmful wrongdoing deserves extra
punishment. 68
Yet the undeserved gratification argument appears to jus-
tify punishing only purposeful harm, not knowing or reckless
harm. If the actor is indifferent to harm rather than seeking it,
there is no extra satisfaction to frustrate through additional
suffering. It seems that the undeserved gratification argument
cannot justify enhanced punishment for causing harm in all
cases. A possible response to this objection is that the desidera-
tive attitudes we wish to negate include indifference to the wel-
fare of victims, and we negate this by forcing the indifferent
offender to share the victim's suffering. But if we thus punish
in order to coerce empathy and remorse, the undeserved gratifi-
cation argument collapses back into the remorse analogy, which
we saw was more about giving victims their due than about
properly repaying offenders.
This implication should prompt us to reexamine the Kant-
ian aim of frustrating the offender's gratification in taking ad-
vantage of a victim. Does this aim derive primarily from a duty
of justice to the offender or a duty of justice to the victim? Pre-
sumably, despite paradoxical claims of Kant and Hegel that of-
fenders had a "right to be punished,"69 the offender is hoping for
neither punishment nor frustration. If we are obliged to spoil
the offender's fun in order to dissociate ourselves from his act,
we are apparently concerned about our obligations to victims.
The offender humiliates a victim by harming him or her, and
the public compounds that humiliation by tolerating it. Kant-
ian morality is a cooperative scheme generating duties on the
part of beneficiaries to cooperators who make the benefits possi-
ble. If we cannot prevent defectors from exploiting trusting co-
operators, we can at least prevent them from enjoying the
benefits and laughing at their victims as chumps. So, one rea-
son we have to prevent the offender's undeserved gratification
67. Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment Than Complete
Crimes, 5 LAw & PHIL. 1, 28-29 (1986).
68. HART, supra note 52, at 131.
69. Markus D. Dubber, The Right to be Punished: Autonomy and its Demise in
Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAw & HIST. REv. 113, 115 (1998).
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is to prevent the consequent degradation of the victim. And we
do this not only to enforce the offender's duty to respect the vic-
tim, but also to fulfill our own.
This reinterpretation of the undeserved gratification argu-
ment as a display of respect for victims brings us to our final
argument for punishing harm: the undeserved status argu-
ment. This argument justifies punishment for actual harm as
necessary to correct the effects of successful crime on the social
status of offenders. It draws on Jean Hampton's expressive ac-
count of punishment as "defeat."70 Hampton presumes that
when one person wrongfully harms another, this offender as-
serts authority over the victim or claims superior honor. The
offender thereby marks the victim as a person of lesser status71
whose interests do not count. A person who suffers such an in-
sult without resistance or retaliation invites more abuse from
others.72 On the other hand, the wrongdoer may gain in status
and become an increasing threat to others if his wrong is left
unredressed 3 According to Hampton, punishment is necessary
to reverse this undeserved increase in status by humbling the
offender. 74 Yet, if the offender's increase in status is unde-
served, so is the victim's decrease in status. It seems at least as
important to correct that injustice. And insofar as the of-
fender's claim to superiority rests on his subordination of a vic-
tim, it seems impossible to decrease the status of the offender
without raising the status of the victim. By punishing, we re-
store the victim's status in much the same way as the victim
might do by means of revenge. As our earlier discussion of pun-
ishment as a substitute for revenge revealed, however, there
are some important differences. On the one hand, the victim
cannot show martial honor and courage by personally avenging
the wrong. On the other hand, the punitive state can back the
70. JEAN HAMPTON, THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 116-42 (Daniel Farn-
ham ed., 2007); Hampton, supra note 44, at 111-61; Jean Hampton, The Moral
Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 217, 227 (1984).
71. Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 31-48 (1992)
(reviewing social scientific evidence of status-seeking behavior).
72. ABBOTT, supra note 47, at 75-76.
73. See generally BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR (1983) (studies
of vengeance in honor-based societies); MILLER, supra note 45, at 179-220.
74. Hampton, supra note 44, at 124-30.
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humiliation of the offender and the vindication of the victim
with its unique authority.
This interpretation of criminal punishment as the state's
exercise of a monopoly on vengeance gives the state a special
obligation to punish those wrongdoers who actually cause harm.
This is because offenders only gain undeserved status by subor-
dinating particular victims. It is humiliating to be injured with
impunity, but people tend to take risk much less personally.
They are not personally compelled to retaliate against risk or
endure loss of face.75 The conception of state punishment as a
substitute for private vengeance implies an undertaking to vin-
dicate particular victims by avenging actual harms, rather than
merely deterring the imposition of risk against the public at
large. 76 Such deterrence may reduce injury, but does nothing to
restore the status of those who have been wrongly injured.
Thus, it does not preempt retaliatory violence, nor does it earn
the loyalty of victims. The state may only justly claim the loy-
alty and demand the forbearance of victims if it fulfills its un-
dertaking to vindicate them.
The state's promise to avenge wrongs against each citizen
explains its obligation to punish particular harms, rather than
maximizing the welfare of all by discouraging the imposition of
risk.77 The citizen's status is not challenged by merely being
subjected to risk as part of a population. Only when he or she is
subjected to unredressed harm is he or she forced into the di-
lemma of retaliating or accepting status degradation. Only
then is the state obliged to exact retribution on his or her behalf
in order to vindicate his or her honor. A failure to do so would
represent the betrayal of a fundamental commitment. In war-
time we often see citizens maintaining their loyalty to a state
even in the face of death.78 But as the Iraqi civil war illustrates,
a state that does not guarantee its citizens' basic civic dignity
cannot expect even compliance, let alone heroic self-sacrifice.
75. Indeed, we tend to regard persons who treat careless behavior as a per-
sonal insult as pathologically sensitive, suffering from "road rage."
76. Hampton, supra note 44, at 124-30.
77. Id.
78. Seidman, supra note 40, at 333 (remarking on the fact that draftees will
go to war rather than to jail, even though the latter is safer).
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Rather than asking whether it is fair or utility-maximizing
to punish actual harm, we should ask how doing so supports the
criminal law's legitimacy. Once the question is posed in this
way, the answer seems almost obvious: punishing harm contrib-
utes to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by vindicat-
ing victims. The ability to thus account for the criminal law's
otherwise puzzling punishment of actual harm is a strong argu-
ment in favor of a political conception of criminal law.
25
